1976年7月13日张春桥与美国参议院共和党领袖斯科特的会谈记录 （译文） 谈话备忘录 1976年7月13日星期二 下午3点15分至下午5点15分 人民大会堂新疆厅 主题：斯科特参议员和张春桥副总理会谈的逐字记录 参与人员： 中方： 张春桥，副总理 施燕华，翻译 周培源，中国人民外交学会副会长 王海容，外交部副部长 唐闻生，外交部美洲大洋洲司副司长 范国祥，中国人民外交学会副处长 程万郴[音译]，中国人民外交学会工作人员 3名记录员 美方： 参议员Hugh Scott Gates大使 Robert Barnett亚洲协会理事 Richard Quick，参议员斯科特的行政助理 Terence Shea，国务院 Charles W. Freeman, Jr.，国务院 Donald Keyser，美国联络处，记录员 ———————————— 张春桥：我知道你是第二次来中国了。 斯科特参议员：是的，这是我第二次访问中华人民共和国。 张：上次没机会会见你。 斯科特：那是我的不幸。我见过你们的外交部长。我与尊敬的总理周恩来先生的会晤非常有益。曼斯菲尔德参议员和我很高兴有这个机会。 张：周总理已经逝世了。我们都记得他为中国人民和改善中美关系所做的贡献。 斯科特：我们党（被翻译误解为共和党）想对贵方朱德先生的去世表示哀悼。 张：谢谢。自 1972 年你第一次访问中国以来，已经有好几年了。你没有去过中国的其他地方。你看到北京的变化了吗？ 斯科特：是的，对人民有利的变化。交通运输有了很大改善。我看到了一种对你们社会制度的共同奉献。似乎西方人来访也有更多的认识。我们觉得我们现在被认可了。我们都被中国人民的热情所感动。我们被告知，你们将继续在卫生和教育方面取得巨大进步。我对教育特别感兴趣，虽然那不是我的专长。我是律师。我曾经做过教师，一次在美国一次在英国。因此，我在我们所参观的北京大学对你们的教学非常感兴趣、非常关注。我们今天参观你们的发掘也让我们有了新的认识。我们今天参观了一所五七干校，给我们留下了深刻的印象。 张：看起来像不像集中营？ （微笑） 斯科特：不，每个人看起来都很忙碌很开心。 张：这是文化大革命以来中国人民实行的重要创举之一。 斯科特：我们问是否所有人都是自愿的，他们说是的。我们看到了他们在建设和种植庄稼方面所做的工作。你的南瓜比我们的大。 张：是的。所以五七干校搞得很好。你上次来中国的时候，我们在批判林彪。你第二次来访问，我们正在批判邓小平。所以你看我们就是好斗。 斯科特：你们有你们的批判，我们也有我们的（笑声）——这是我们两个不同制度的一部分。 张：天下大乱。 斯科特：是的，尽管人们祈求天命，但总是天下大乱。 张：这是因为矛盾。 斯科特：关于你之前的问题，我看到你们的手工艺品的质量和数量都有很大的提高。比起四年多前你们的商店里似乎有更多东西。 张：是的，这个领域发展比较快。 斯科特：在美国，我们非常欣赏中国的手工艺和艺术品。我对最近发现的秦始皇陵很感兴趣，这无疑是自1946年图坦卡蒙陵墓发掘以来最重要的发现之一。 张：秦始皇陵还没有开挖。发掘出土的是陵墓周围。 斯科特：那么接下来一定会有更奇妙的发现。 张：斯科特参议员真是亚洲文物方面的专家。 斯科特：被称为专家只是比别人知道的多一点。多年来，我一直在学习中国历史。我知道一些杨贵妃的事。贵国内部发生过许多斗争、破坏和分裂的事例。斗争总是在继续。 张：是的，你是对的。杨贵妃没有历史贡献，但秦始皇在历史上有很大贡献。 斯科特：是的，她（杨贵妃）就像充满卡路里一样充满烦恼。他（秦始皇）被称为中国的大一统者。对吗？ 张：中国的统一从来没有像现在这样巩固。目前只有台湾还没有解放，不能说中国是完全统一了。 斯科特：但是有8亿人民，我相信你们已经取得了长足的发展。你一定会为有这么多人并将他们团结起来感到非常自豪。 由于总统竞选，我们目前处于不确定时期，直到11月。但正如《纽约时报》48小时前的社论所言，福特总统和卡特州长对亚洲的外交政策大体相同。两人都致力于上海公报。现在两者都不能大步行动，像选举后的胜利者可以做的那样。 我们的制度发生了变化，特别是在过去四年中。例如，根据我们的宪法，国会越来越多地承担权力。我举一个例子，我投票反对福特总统。关于总统的宣战权，今后在此类军事行动中，总统必须提出建议、协商并说明其行动的理由。然后它可以在一定天数后被国会取消。总统否决了这项法案，但国会推翻了否决。此后，任何总统都不能在不考虑通过国会代表表达的舆论影响的情况下单独行动。未经国会协商批准，总统不得采取任何行动。 同一时期的另一个发展已经显现出来。国会在外交政策决定中获得了更多权力。但它也支持总统对强大国防的渴望。前几年，国防预算经常被国会削减10-12%，但去年国会批准了总统要求的99.4%的预算。这表明国会对强大的国防越来越感兴趣，并愿意动用拨款的权力。 我有……（注意到）……你提到台湾。我将解释对你似乎是矛盾的地方。我们走向正常化的行动取决于公众舆论的调整。我们必须调整那些在尼克松访华之前受到另一种调整的人的观点。你必须调整8亿人的想法。我们必须将2亿人的思想从一种观点调整到另一种观点。在我看来，改进的沟通、知识、技术和技能的交流——我们相信商业也发挥了作用——对于这个调整过程非常重要。当我们改变方向时，我们必须得到人民的认可。法国有句老话——也许南希[指唐闻生]能解释一下——说首相望着窗外，看到很多人在行进，说有我的人民，我是他们的领袖，我必须赶上他们的头。我们注意到，无论何时你们派代表团访问美国，总是会受到热情接待，无论是在大地方还是在小地方。他们在大地方和小地方都受到温暖和热情的欢迎。当我们的人民来到这里时，他们回去时总是对中国人民的善良和好客赞不绝口。我们相信，这将比领导人所说的更能改变观点。当你们的中国体操运动员和杂耍运动员来到美国时，许多美国孩子开始拿起盘子，尝试杂耍。在他们的戏剧中，他们打碎了很多瓷(china)——瓷器。但即使我们失去了很多瓷器，我们也获得了友谊。我们的国与国关系归根结底是取决于这些孩子的未来。你有什么问题吗？我愿意回答任何事情。 张：既然你从台湾开始，我也想就这个问题说几句。你说了很多需要改变思想方向的东西。我们这边没有改变。因为八亿中国人民在这个问题上是一致的，全中国人民都想解放台湾。有不赞成解放台湾的吗？是的，但他们不属于“人民”的范畴——他们是蒋介石和他的儿子蒋经国之流。蒋介石与我们斗到死，但问题还没解决。参议员知道福建和台湾之间还有炮火。 斯科特：我知道这一点。我也知道——虽然这是一件非常小的事情——我们已经从金门和马祖撤回了一些观察员。 张：他们老早就该走了。 （对在场的同事微笑。） 斯科特：随着时间的推移，已经大幅减少。已经有4000人撤离。美国军队还没有全部撤离。但是这个（缩减）过程是不可逆的。 张：目前我们还在做准备。这不是军事秘密。最近几天，我们在福建进行了小规模的军事演习。台湾很紧张。 斯科特：这对我来说是个新闻。他们什么都不告诉我。我们留在台湾的存在已经如此渺小，选举后我们将继续朝你的观点前进。但我作为一个普通公民发言。我不知道谁会成为总统。 张：参议员先生，您认为这个问题会拖多久？作为普通公民，你会讨论多久？我们的立场很明确：我们要按照日本的三点方式解决台湾问题。它们是：1）与台湾断绝外交关系； 2）从台湾撤出所有军队； 3) 废除与台湾的条约。 斯科特：我不知道谁会成为总统，福特还是卡特。我预计就职典礼后会有合理的运动。但我无法预测；我不是他们头脑中的居民。你们已故的周总理说：“我们有耐心。”在我们试图调整美国人民的意见时，我们希望我们能找到一种方法来确保一位领导人所做的事情不会被又一未来的领导人所撤销。我们希望在和平的环境中进行。只有当美国人民支持我们，只有当美国人对我们目标的理解发生显著变化时，我们才能采取行动防止未来领导人取消政策。在我们的内部事务中，我们确实有问题。在民主社会中，问题在于说服人民。 张：你不能把这个责任推给美国人民。正如参议员所说，不解决这个问题不符合美国人民的利益。美中两国人民历来友好，无论是历史还是现在。所以美国人民不应该为目前的事态负责。 斯科特：我认为这是一个非常慷慨、非常理解的声明。我希望在 1-2-3 年内看到这样一种情况，我们可以说我们终于找到了一个令人满意的解决方案，而不是因为我们不再试图相互理解而让关系建立起来。和其他许多人一样，巴内特先生在这件事上写得很博学。这将对美国公众接受我们的举措产生最终的影响。 《伊索寓言》中有句名言：“在我第一次看到你走多快之前，我看不到你需要多长时间才能到达下一个国家。” 张：那我们就拭目以待吧。 斯科特：恐怕是这样。但从长远来看，我们将对最终的和平解决感到非常满意。 张：“最终的和平解决？”（讽刺地）这是指美中关系，还是指中国与台湾蒋经国当局的关系？ 斯科特：我谈到了美国和中国。因为我们认为最终的解决符合有关各方的利益，上海公报没有要求任何这些事情发生在给定的时间或时钟。这是中方在上海公报中提出的前提条件。我们不能也不鼓励蒋经国的冒险主义。我们不希望看到任何东西来自你所说的台湾现在存在的这种紧张情绪。 张：我不明白。你认为美国和中国应该为台湾开战吗？台湾完全是我国的内政问题。和平解决的可能性很小。我们在这方面有很多经验。通过战争解决这个问题比较可靠。 斯科特：我想我被误解了。我同意中国和台湾的关系是内部关系。我自己打过两次战争——两次都站在你这边——我认为很难为任何战争辩护。我怀疑任何一方都可以证明其人民为此而战是正当的。我非常反战。我被枪打过。这是反对战争的最好理由。我们应该在讨论和理解后解决我们的问题。美国人民还没有对日本方式说“是”或“不是”。他们最不愿意考虑的就是战争。美国人民对战争有恐惧（译者将其翻译为美国人民害怕战争）。我认为我们的政策应该像周总理所说的那样：除了保卫自己领土外，不打仗。即使在这里，和平解决方案也更有可能和更可取。 张：台湾也是我国领土的一部分。但我想我们已经花了很多时间。没有必要争论。我们的立场非常明确，没有改变。还有很多事情有待观察。今年你们不会解决这个问题。 斯科特：我无法预测，因为我不知道谁将成为总统或谁将成为国会议员。也许会有多达 100 名甚至 150 名国会新成员。当你有新成员时，政策很容易发生变化。但不能改变以影响美国的亚洲政策。 张：但是对台湾我们很清楚。自从台湾问题出现以来，这就是套在美国脖子上的绞索。取消它符合美国人民的利益。如果你们不这样做，人民解放军（PLA）将切断它。这对美国和中国人民都有好处。在台湾问题上，中国人民不欠美国的帐。美国占领了台湾。我们很慷慨，准备用我们的刺刀帮助美国解决问题——也许这听起来不愉快，但事实就是如此。 斯科特：“用我们的刺刀解决问题？”这是什么意思？ 张：推翻蒋帮。 斯科特：不，这听起来不愉快。我们的政策是不干涉你们的内政——但我们随时准备遵行我们对台湾的承诺。我们认为，如果诉诸武力，将违反《上海公报》。任何此类行动都会引起 2.15 亿美国人的关注。我将继续敦促沿着和平道路前进。虽然我们承认贵方的权利，但我请您承认我们的困难。 张：你谈到我们的权利（挥手讨论这个问题）。这当然是你必须做的。这是我们的内政，没有必要要求别人承认我们的权利。你知不知道在蒋经国的报刊上，骂我为“张匪”？ 斯科特：我国的文章拿很多东西叫我。 张：那是你的内政，我不干涉。但是，我想告诉你，我国的内战并没有停止。我们没有那种你可以和平解放某个地方的经验。例如，北京可以说是和平解放的。但这是如何实现的呢？那时整个华北都已经解放了，只有北京还没有解放。我们的武装部队在北京城外是已准备好了。甚至我们在北京的人也组织起来欢迎解放军。（转向周培源）例如，在北京大学，许多人已经准备好欢迎解放军。 周培源：天津呢？ 张：不，天津是通过战斗解放的。所以也许只有那一种“和平”的解放；发生在北京的那种。我们的对手是一样的。我们很了解他们。我们从实际的角度考虑我们的政策。 斯科特：我们的讨论主要是关于和平方式，例如日本方式。我们还没讨论你们主要是内部的问题。 张：关于上海公报，我们同样希望得到落实。我们仍然愿意按照它行事。（回应唐闻生对斯科特参议员观点的澄清）《上海公报》里没有讲到和平解放。 斯科特：我没说那里有。这样的公报几乎不会说战争是和平的替代品。这是你们的内战。 张：上海公报承认只有一个中国。 斯科特：是的。 张：双方应继续按照上海公报行事。 斯科特：这就是我正在讨论的。随着上海公报的发展，请问您对中美关系正常化的后续发展有何设想？ 张：现在，根据特定情况，双方可以做更多的事情。但最大的问题是悬而未决。那就是台湾。到目前为止，我们只谈到了台湾。但在国际舞台上，双方有很多共同点。 斯科特：我很高兴你提到了这一点。我们认为，维护欧洲稳定、强大的北约、强大的国防、反对霸权至关重要。我可以给你一个例子。安哥拉是一件非常不幸的事情。总统和国务卿为国会不愿支持他们的政策感到沮丧。这些事情确实时常发生在我们身上。国会有时会延迟政策的实施——这是令人沮丧的根源。行政长官反对超级大国的干预。但立法机构担心，支持总统可能会导致美国军队的投入。 我不同意。 张：在安哥拉，我的看法是你处理得不是很好。你搞砸了。北极熊去了安哥拉。这可以教育非洲人民。 斯科特：对于北极熊来说，这是一个糟糕的时机。 张：非洲的气候不适合北极熊。总有一天他会被赶走。 斯科特：我们的观点和你一样。一段时间后，那个超级大国的存在会适得其反，各国将转而反对它。 张：嗯，既然你跑了，北极熊就进来了。这将教育非洲人民。非洲人民会看到这一点，对此我们很乐观。南半球的气候对北极熊不利。 斯科特：我们相信我们没有逃跑，而是从未进入。 张：在你这边，你或许觉得北极熊太饿了，所以你拿你的粮食喂给它。这很有趣。 斯科特：我们也把我们的粮食卖给你。 张：（讽刺地）这倒是很平等。 斯科特：我们认为食物不应该被用作外交政策的工具。 张：你们的口号是“粮食换和平”。这就是外交政策的工具。 斯科特：是的，如果世界各地的人饿了，他们都会对政府不满。我们已经帮助了世界上一半以上的国家的饥饿者。这样一来，我们就让纳税人买了单。美国纳税人必须将其收入的 20% 到 40% 用于纳税。这些税收大部分用于赠赈计划。我们粜谷，但我们也像多年来在印度一样赈济很多东西。我们免费这样做。如果这是外交政策的工具，那它肯定是没效果的。 张：我刚才说的是你对北极熊的态度。我今天没有准备和你讨论你们的食品政策。但我可以发表一些见解。至于你向中国出售粮食，我说实话。卖给中国的数量起不了多大作用。就算你把你所有的粮食储备都捐给了中国及其八亿人民，这又能证明什么呢？分到每个碗里我们每人就几粒谷子。 斯科特：当然，我们承认中国正在维持并能够养活其人民。我们相信贸易以及与所有人一起买卖的意愿。在发生灾难和严重饥荒的地方，我们提供了食物。美国的总体政策是准备与所有国家进行买卖。现代世界的一大奇迹是，中国不仅可以养活所有人民，而且明显提高了生活水平——例如，与印度的政府形成鲜明对比。所以我们很佩服你。 张：这不是因为印度人民解决不了他们的问题，而是因为他们的政府和制度。 斯科特：我倾向于同意你的看法。对于制度的问题，我们可能有不同的解决方案，但我同意你的观点，问题在于制度。您如何看待中美贸易关系的继续和扩大？我们欢迎并将继续欢迎与贵方的贸易。 张：恐怕在目前的情况下不可能大规模进行（即贸易）。我们认为维持关系现状是可以的。你怎么看？ 斯科特：必须考虑国际收支平衡。 张：不是这个因素。目前的政治形势决定了我们只能维持目前的水平。我恐怕关系正常化之前不会有太大进展。 斯科特：我们随时准备买卖。我们尊重你的判断。 张：8亿人口的这个大市场给了我们很大的回旋余地。我们主要自力更生来解决我们的问题。任何其他国家都很难满足我国的需要。在贸易领域，我们依赖国内贸易。我们的对外贸易只占我们贸易的一小部分。当然，我们不排除在必要条件下满足对方需求的必要性。 斯科特：巴内特先生问一个关于东盟的问题是否合适？他是东盟方面的专家，曾在这些国家工作过。 张：时间不多了。但请提问题吧。 巴内特：我走遍了东南亚，注意到了朝着和平、自由和中立区域概念发展的趋势。我听到这些国家对中国支持这一概念感到满意。我很想知道你对东盟的态度，尤其是对中立化概念的态度。 张：昨天乔外长和你讨论过这个问题。但我会回答你。中国支持他们的中立愿望，支持他们驱逐霸权的愿望。但在我们看来，这并不容易。你不同意吗？我自己从来没有去过那里。 巴内特：我希望他们在对抗霸权方面不会有太大的困难。他们之间真正的团结和理解需要时间，但前景是好的。 张：是的，我说的是真的，他们之间会有困难，外部势力可能会介入。中国不会干涉他们的事务。 斯科特：我们非常感谢您给我们的时间。我们知道您有多忙。我希望你同意我将我们的讨论转达给总统的愿望——他也是我的私交。 张：我不能反对你把这些谈话转达给你们的总统。但我希望我们的谈话不会被公布。 斯科特：我认为我们只会公布我们进行了坦诚和直率的讨论。我们讨论的主题包括台湾、商业和一些外交政策问题。我不想违背任何信任。 张：我不知道你所说的“违背信任”是什么意思。 斯科特：讨论我们谈话的内容。 盖茨大使：我想说的是，副总理先生，如你所知执行上海公报的原则是美国政府的政策。两位总统公开和私下都表明了这一点。只有时间和方式是不确定的。参议员是政治领袖。他从这个角度讨论过。在我们这边，当我们处理条约安排时，这最终需要得到国会的同意。我认为这就是参议员想要表达的意思。他希望发生的是，会形成有利的共识。当那个时候到来时。 斯科特：我们正在寻求在国会绝对多数通过。我们不希望一票多数，这会导致争议。 张：这是美国的事情。但中方提出的实现邦交正常化的三个条件应全部满足。任何想要阻止这种情况的人都将被历史追责。 盖茨大使：我们理解你的立场。 你已经说得很清楚了。 张：你明天要走吗？ 斯科特：是的——去洛阳、大连、苏州和上海。 MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION Tuesday, July 13, 1976 3:15 PM to 5:15 PM Sinkiang Room Great Hall of the People SUBJECT: Verbatim Transcript of Meeting Between Senator Scott and Vice Premier Chang Chun-chiao PARTICIPANTS: Chinese side: Chang Chun-chiao, Vice Premier Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter Chou Pei-yuan, Vice President, Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) Wang Hai-jung, Vice Foreign Minister Tang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, American and Oceanic Affairs Department, Foreign Ministry Fan Kuo-hsiang, Deputy Division Chief, CPIFA Cheng Wan-chen, Staff, CPIFA 3 Notetakers American side: Senator Hugh Scott Ambassador Gates Robert Barnett, Director, Asia Society Richard Quick, Administrative Assistant to Senator Scott Terence Shea, Department of State Charles W. Freeman, Jr., Department of State Donald Keyser, US Liaison Office, Notetaker ____________________________________________ Chang Chun-chiao: I understand that this is the second time you have come to China. Senator Scott: Yes, this is my second trip to the People's Republic of China. Chang: Last time I had no chance to meet you. Scott: That is my misfortune. I have met your Foreign Minister. My meetings with your distinguished Prime Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai, were very useful. Senator Mansfield and I were very happy to have had that opportunity. Chang: Premier Chou is already dead. We all remember his contributions to the Chinese people and to the improvement of Sino-US relations. Scott: Our party (misconstrued by interpreter as Republican Party) wants to extend condolences on the death of your Mr. Chu Teh. Chang: Thank you. It has been several years since 1972--your first visit to China. You haven't been to other parts of China. Have you seen any changes in Peking? Scott: Yes, changes which have been to the benefit of the people. There has been improvement in transportation. I have seen a common dedication to your system of society. There also seems to be more awareness of visits from Westerners. We feel that we are recognized now. We have all been moved by the cordiality of the Chinese people. We are told that you will continue to make great progress in health and education. I'm especially interested in education, although that is not my specialty. I'm a lawyer. I was once a teacher, once in the US and once in England. I was therefore very interested in and paid much attention to your teaching at Peking University which we have visited. Our visit to your excavations today has also given us a new awareness. We were very impressed by our visit today to a May 7 Cadre School. Chang: Did it look like a concentration camp? (smiling) Scott: No, everyone seemed busy and happy. Chang: This is one of the important measures taken by the Chinese since the Cultural Revolution. Scott: We asked if all were volunteers and they said yes. We were shown the kind, of work they did in building and in cultivating crops. You grow bigger squash than ours. Chang: Yes. So the May 7 Cadre School is doing very well. The last time you came to China we were criticizing Lin Piao. Now we are criticizing Teng during your second visit. So you see that we like to struggle. Scott: You have your criticisms and we have ours (laughter) --This is part of our two different systems. Chang: There is great disorder everywhere. Scott: Yes, there is always great disorder everywhere even though the people pray for the mandate of heaven. Chang: This is because of contradictions. Scott: Regarding your earlier question, I have seen a significant improvement in the quality and quantity of your arts and crafts. There appear to be even more than four years ago in your stores. Chang: Yes, there has been relatively quick development in this field. Scott: In America we are great admirers of Chinese craftsmanship and works of art. I was interested in the recent dis­covery of the tombs of Chin Shih Huang, which is certainly one of the most significant discoveries since the 1946 open­ing of Tutankhamen's tomb. Chang: The tomb of Chin Shih Huang has not yet been excavated. The excavations are from around the tomb. Scott: Then there must be even more marvelous discoveries to come. Chang: Senator Scott is quite an expert on Asian cultural relics. Scott: To be called an expert is only to know a little more than someone else. For many years I've studied Chinese history. I know about Yang Kuei-fei. There have been many instances of struggle, disruption, and divisiveness within your country. Struggle always continues. Chang: Yes, you are right. Yang Kuei-fei made no historic contributions but Chin Shih Huang made great contributions in history. Scott: Yes, she (Yang Kuei-fei) was as full of trouble as calories. He (Chin Shih Huang) was known as the great unifier of China. Right? * Chang: The unity of China has never been as consolidated as it is now. At present only Taiwan is not liberated — so we can't say that China is totally unified. Scott: But with 800 million people, I'm sure that you have already achieved much development. You must feel very proud at taking so many people and unifying them. We are presently in a period of uncertainty until November because of the Presidential campaign. But as the New York Times said editorially only 48 hours ago, the foreign policy of President Ford and Governor Carter toward Asia are sub­stantially the same. Both are committed to the Shanghai Communique. Neither can move substantially now, as the victor could do after the election. We have had changes occurring in our system, notably during the last four years. For example, there has been an in­creasing assumption of authority — under our Constitution — by the Congress. I will give you one example where I voted against President Ford. Regarding the President's power to declare war, hereafter in this kind of military action the President must advise, consult with, and give reasons for his action. Then it could be cancelled by the Congress after a certain number of days. The President vetoed this Bill but Congress overrode it. Hereafter no President can move alone without taking into consideration the impact of public opinion as expressed through their representatives in the Congress. Without approval of the Congress through consultation, there can be no action by the President. Another development in the same period of time has manifested itself. The Congress has assumed more authority in foreign policy decisions. But it also supports the President in his desire for a strong national defense. In previous years the national defense budget was often cut 10-12 percent by the Congress, but last year the Congress approved 99.4 per­cent of the budget requested by the President. This indicates that the Congress is more and more interested in a strong national defense and is willing to use the power of appropriations. I have ...(noted)...your reference to Taiwan. I will explain what seem to you to be contradictions. Our movement toward implementation of normalization depends upon condi­tioning of public opinion. We must condition the opinion of people who until the Nixon visit were conditioned the other way. You must condition the thinking of 800 million people. We must condition 200 millions' thought from one view to another. In my view, improved communications, exchange of knowledge, techniques and skills — we believe commerce also plays a role — are very important to this process of conditioning. As we change direction we must change with the approval of the people. There is an old French saying — perhaps Nancy can interpret it — which says that the Prime Minister looked out the window, saw that many people were marching, said that there are my people, I am their leader, I must hurry to their head. We have noted that whenever you send delegations to the United States they are always received with enthusiasm, in big places and in small. They are received with warmth and enthusiasm, in big places and in small. When our people come here they always return with great praise for the kindness and hospitality of the Chinese people. We believe that this will change opinion more than what a leader says. When your Chinese gymnasts and jugglers came to the US, many American children began to pick up dishes and try to juggle them. In their play they smashed a lot of china — of porcelain. But even though we have lost a lot of porcelain we have gained friendship. What our country-to- country relationship comes down to is these children's future. Do you have any questions? I'm willing to answer anything. Chang: Since you started with Taiwan, I'd also like to say a few words on this issue. You have said much which is needed to change the direction of thinking. We have not changed on our side. Because the 800 million Chinese people are in agreement on this issue, all the Chinese people want to liberate Taiwan. Are there those who don't favor liberation of Taiwan? Yes, but they don't belong to the category of "the people" — they are Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo elements. Chiang Kai-shek fought against us to his death, but the question is still unresolved. The Senator knows that between Fukien and Taiwan there is still artillery fire. Scott: I'm aware of this. I'm also aware –that though it is a very small thing--we have withdrawn a few observers from Quemoy and Matsu. Chang: They should have left long ago. (Smiling to his colleagues present.) Scott: Over time there has already been a substantial reduction. There have already been 4000 troops withdrawn. There has not been a total removal of American forces. But that process (of reduction) is not reversible. Chang: At present we are still making preparations. This is no military secret. In recent days in Fukien we have conducted small-scale military exercises. Taiwan is very nervous. Scott: That's news to me. They don't tell me anything. Our presence remaining on Taiwan is already so slender that after the election we will continue to move toward your views. But I speak as a private citizen. I don't know who will be President. Chang: Mr. Senator, how long do you think this issue will be dragged on? How long will you discuss it as a private citizen? Our position is very clear: We want to settle the Taiwan issue by following the Japanese formula, which has three points. They are: 1) severance of diplomatic relations with Taiwan; 2) withdrawal of all military forces from Taiwan; and 3) abrogation of the treaty with Taiwan. Scott: I don't know who will be President, Ford or Carter. I would expect reasonable movement after the inauguration. But I can't predict; I'm not a resident of their minds. Your late Premier Mr. Chou said: "We are a patient people." In our attempt to condition the opinion of the American people, we hope that we can find a way to assure that things done by one leader can't be undone by a future leader. We want this to be done in a peaceful context. Only when the American people are behind us and only when American understanding of our objectives has undergone a marked change can we act to prevent undoing a policy by a future leader. In our internal affairs we do have problems. In a democratic society the problem is to convince the people. Chang: You can't place this responsibility on the American people. Failure to settle this issue, as the Senator has said, is not in the interest of the American people. The American and Chinese peoples have always been friendly, in history and now. So the American people shouldn't be held responsible for the present state of affairs. Scott: I think that is very generous, a very understanding statement. What I would like to see in 1-2-3 years is a situation where we could say we have finally worked out an agreeable solution rather than to have the relationship founder because we have stopped trying to understand each other. Mr. Barnett has written very learnedly on the matter, as have many others. This will have an ultimate effect of conditioning the American public to accept our moves. There is a saying from "Aesop's Fables": "I can't see how long it will take you to get to the next country until I first see how fast you walk." Chang: So then we must wait and see. Scott: I'm afraid so. But in the long run we will have great satisfaction in an ultimate peaceful solution. Chang: "ultimate peaceful solution?"(Sarcastically) Does this refer to US-China relations or to relations between China and the Chiang Ching-kuo regime on Taiwan? Scott: I spoke of the US and China. Because we believe that an ultimate settlement is in the interests of the parties involved, the Shanghai Communique did not require that any of these things occur at a given hour or by a clock. These were preconditions stated by the Chinese side in the Shanghai Communique. We cannot and do not encourage any adventurism on the part of Chiang Ching-kuo. We would not like to see anything come from such nervous­ness as you say exists on Taiwan now. Chang: I don't understand. Do you think that the US and China should fight war over Taiwan? Taiwan is totally our domestic issue. There is very little possibility of a peaceful settlement. We have much experience in this respect. It is more reliable to settle this question through a war. Scott: I think I am being misunderstood. I agree that the relationship between China and Taiwan is an internal relationship. I myself have fought in two wars — both times on your side — and I think that it is difficult to justify any war. I doubt that either side could justify to its people going to war for this cause. I am extremely anti-war. I've been shot at. This is the best reason to oppose war. We should solve our problems after discussion and understanding. The American people have not yet said yes or no to the Japanese formula. The last thing they would consider is a war. The American people have a horror of war (the translater rendered this as the American people are afraid of war). I think our policy should be as Premier Chou stated: Don't go to war except in defense of one's territories. Even here peaceful solutions are more likely and more desirable. Chang: Taiwan is also part of our territory. But I think we have already used up a lot of time. There is no need to argue. Our position is very clear and it is unchanged. Much still remains to be seen. This year you will not settle this issue. Scott: I can't predict, because I don't know who will be President or who will be in Congress. Perhaps there will be as many as 100 or even 150 new members of the Congress. When you have new members there are apt to be changes in policy. But not changes so as to affect America's Asian policy. Chang: But we are very clear on Taiwan. Since the issue of Taiwan has arisen, this is a noose around the neck of the US. It is in the interests of the American people to take it off. If you don't, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will cut it off. This will be good both for the American and Chinese peoples. With regard to Taiwan, the Chinese people are not in debt to the United States. The US has occupied Taiwan. We are generous and ready to help the US solve the problem by our bayonets — perhaps that doesn't sound pleasant but that is the way it is. Scott: "To solve the problem by our bayonets?" What does this mean? Chang: To overthrow the Chiang clique. Scott: No. That doesn't sound pleasant. Our policy is not to interfere in your internal affair — but we stand ready to back up our commitment to Taiwan. We believe it would be in default of the Shanghai Communique if there were a resort to arms. Any such action would arouse 215 million Americans. I would continue to urge progres­sing along the path of peace. While we recognize your rights, I ask you to recognize our difficulties. Chang: You talk about our rights (discussing this with a wave of the hand). This you must do, of course. It is our internal affair and there is no need to ask others to recognize our rights. Did you know that in Chiang Ching-kuo's press I am called "Bandit Chang"? Scott: My papers call me many things. Chang: That is your affair and I would not interfere. However, I want to show you that our civil war has not stopped. We don't have the experience that you can peacefully liberate some place. For example, Peking could be said to have been liberated by peaceful means. But how was this carried out? At that time the whole of North China was already liberated and only Peking- was not yet liberated. Our armed forces were prepared outside the city of Peking. And even our people inside Peking were organized to welcome the PLA. (Turning to Chou Pei-yuan) for example, at Peking University many had prepared to welcome the PLA. Chou Pei-yuan: What about Tientsin? Chang: No, Tientsin was liberated by fighting. So perhaps there is only that kind of "peaceful" liberation; the kind that occurred in Peking. Our adversary is the same. We know them well. We consider our policy from the practical viewpoint. Scott: Our discussions have primarily been about peaceful formulas such as the Japanese formula. We have not dis­cussed your primarily internal question. Chang: With regard to the Shanghai Communique, we likewise hope that it will be implemented. We are still willing to act in accordance with it. (Responding to a clarification of Senator Scott’s point by Tang Wen-sheng) The Shanghai Communique has nothing in it about peaceful liberation. Scott: I didn't say there was. Such a communique would hardly speak of war as an alternative to peace. This is your civil war. Chang: The Shanghai Communique recognizes only one China. Scott: Yes. Chang: Both sides should continue to act in accord with the Shanghai Communique. Scott: That is what I am discussing. As the Shanghai Communique evolves, may I ask what you envision as the continuing relationship between China and the US pending normalization? Chang: Now, according to certain circumstances, both sides can do more. But the biggest problem is unsettled. That is Taiwan. So far we have only spoken about Taiwan. But in the international arena both sides have many points in common. Scott: I'm glad that you have mentioned this. We believe it important to maintain stability in Europe, to have a strong NATO, to have a strong national defense, and to oppose hegemony. I can give you an illustration. Angola was a very unfortunate thing. The President and the Secretary of State were frustrated by the unwillingness of Congress to support their policy. These things do happen to us from time to time. Congress sometimes delays implementation of policy — this is a source of frustration. The Executive was opposed to the intervention of a super­power. But the Legislative body feared that to support the President might have led to a commitment of American forces. I didn't agree. Chang: In Angola, my view is that you didn't handle it very beautifully. You messed it up. The Polar Bear went to Angola. This can educate the African people. Scott: It was bad timing for the Polar Bear. Chang: The climate in Africa is unsuited to the Polar Bear. Someday he will be driven away. Scott: Our view is the same as yours. The presence of that superpower after a while becomes counterproductive and countries will turn against it. Chang: Well, since you ran away the Polar Bear entered. This will educate the African people. We are optimistic that the African people will see it. The climate in the southern hemisphere is not good for the Polar Bear. Scott: We believe that we didn't run away but never entered. Chang: On your side you seem to think that the Polar Bear is too hungry so you feed it your grain. This is very interesting. Scott: We sell our grain to you too. Chang: (With heavy irony) That is very equal. Scott: We believe that food should not be used as an instrument of foreign policy. Chang: You have the slogan "Food for Peace”. This is an instrument of foreign policy. Scott: Yes, people everywhere are dissatisfied with their government if they are hungry. We have aided the hungry in more than half of the nations of the world. In so doing we have made the taxpayer foot the bill. The American taxpayer must give 20 to 40 percent of his income in taxes. Most of these taxes go to giveaway programs. We sell grain, but we also give much away as over the years in India. We do this for free. If this was an instrument of foreign policy, it certainly didn't work. Chang: What I was just referring to was your attitude toward the Polar Bear. I did not come today prepared to discuss your food policy with you. But I can make some comments. As for your sale of grain to China, I'll be honest. The amount sold to China can't play much role. Even if you gave away your whole food reserves to China and its 800 million people, what would this prove? In each bowl we would have only a few grains. Scott: We recognize, of course, that China is sustaining and able to feed its people. We believe in trade and in a willingness to buy and sell with all. Where disasters and serious hunger have occurred, we have given food. The general policy of the US is to be pre­pared to buy and sell with all countries. One of the great miracles of the modern world is that China not only can feed all its people but also so obviously raise standard of living — in violent contrast to the admini­stration of India, for example. So we admire you. Chang: It is not because the Indian people cannot resolve their problems but because of their government and system. Scott: I am inclined to agree with you. We might have different solutions for the problems of the system, but I agree with you that it is the system. What do you think of continuation and expansion of trade relations with the United States? We have welcomed and will continue to welcome trade with you. Chang: I'm afraid that is impossible under current circumstances to have this (i.e. trade) on a large scale. We think that it is all right to maintain the present state of affairs. What do you think? Scott: Balance of payments has to be considered. Chang: This is not the factor. The present political situation has decided that we can only maintain the current level. I'm afraid that there can't be much progress before normalization of relations. Scott: We stand ready to both buy and sell. We respect your judgments. Chang: This big market of 800 million people provides us much room for maneuver. We mainly rely on our own strength to solve our problems. Any other country would find it difficult to meet the needs of our country. In the trade field we depend on internal trade. Our foreign trade occupies only a small percentage of our trade. Of course we don't rule out the necessity to supply each other's needs under necessary conditions. Scott: Would it be appropriate for Mr. Barnett to ask a question regarding ASEAN? He is an expert on ASEAN and has spent time in those countries. Chang: There is not much time. But please ask the question. Barnett: I travelled through Southeast Asia and noted the movement toward a concept of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. I have heard the satisfaction of those countries that the PRC had given its support to that concept. I would be interested in your attitude toward ASEAN, particularly toward the concept of neutralization. Chang: This question Foreign Minister Chiao discussed with you yesterday. But I will answer you. China supports their desire for neutrality and supports their desire to expel hegemony. But in our view that won't be easy. Don't you agree? I have never been there myself. Barnett: I hope they won't have too much difficulty in opposing hegemony. It will take time for real unity and understanding among themselves but the prospects are good. Chang: Yes, what I said is true, they will have difficulties between themselves and outside forces may intervene. China will not intervene in their affairs. Scott: We really appreciate the time you have given us. We know how busy you are. I hope that you will agree with my wish to convey our discussions to the President — who is also my personal friend. Chang: I can't object to your conveying these discussions to your President. But I hope that our discussions will not be published. Scott: I think that we can only publish that we held frank and candid discussions. Among the subjects we discussed were Taiwan, commerce, and some foreign policy matters. I don't want to violate any confidence. Chang: I don't know what you mean by "violation of confidence." Scott: Discussing the substance of our talks. Ambassador Gates: I'd like to say that as you know,Mr. Vice Premier, it is the policy of the U.S. Government to carry out the principles of the Shanghai Communique.Two Presidents have stated this pubicly and privately. Only the timing and formula remain indefinite. The Senator is a political leader. He has discussed from that point of view. From our side, when we deal with treaty arrangements, this ultimately requires the consent of Congress. I think that is what the Senator is trying to say. What he hopes will happen is that a favorable consensus will develop. When that times comes. Scott: We are seeking a strong majority approval in Congress. We do not want a one vote majority which will then result in dispute. Chang: This is the affair of the United States. But the three conditions set by China for normalization of relations should be met in their entirety. Anyone wishing to prevent this will be held responsible by history. Ambassador Gates: We understand your position. You have made it very clear. Chang: Are you leaving tomorrow? Scott: Yes — for Loyang, Dairen, Suchow and Shanghai. 出处：美国DDRS- 286414